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The carnage which started with the suicidal bombing
of New York's World Trade Center (WTC) on Septem-
ber 11 has resumed with massive American bombing
of Afghanistan on the evening of 7 October 2001. It is
the first war of the 21s t century, pitting the world's
strongest, richest, most technologically advanced
country against a country that is among the poorest
and least developed. It also happens to be between a
Western, predominately Christian country and a
Muslim, Middle Eastern country; between a secular
democracy and an avowed theocracy. The list of con-
trasts probably contains many more dichotomies –
making the Huntingtonians applaud the seeming ful-
filment of their 'clash of civilizations' prophecy.
A Note from Prison
L e g i t i m a t e
Accounts, Wrong
A c c o u n t a n t s
I am writing from my Egyptian prison cell in
the fourth week of the American air cam-
paign against Afghanistan. By the time
these reflections are published, the present
battle may be over, but not the war itself.
The next battles of this war are bound to
break out and could be anywhere in what
Zbignew Brzezinski aptly called the 'arch of
crisis'. Just over ten years ago, a similar bat-
tle involving the US and another Middle
Eastern country – Iraq – broke out and has
never been completely ended. Before Iraq
and Afghanistan, the US became militarily
involved with ground forces and/or air
power in Lebanon (1982/83), Iran (1980/81),
Libya (1980s), Somalia and the Sudan
(1990s). No other world region has experi-
enced as many active American military in-
tentions in the last three decades.
The fact that America is part of 'the West'
and that the Middle East is part of 'the Rest'
may or may not be a coincidence. Intellectu-
als are forcefully taking sides, but the empir-
ical evidence is still insufficient for testing
Huntington's 'grand theory' of the late 20t h
century. My reflections here do not address
that grand theorizing; not for lack of temp-
tation to do so, but for lack of references at
hand and diminished margins of freedom in
a Middle Eastern prison.
Instead, I will address far more modest
questions. Why does our part of the world
generate these frequent battles with the
West, specifically the US? And why do the
Middle Eastern antagonists keep losing the
battles, with no apparent end to the war
with the West? The brief answer to the first
question is that peoples of the Middle East
have truly legitimate accounts to settle with
the West; and to the second question is that
wrong accountants impose themselves on
our people to settle those accounts. Proper
accountants are yet to emerge – true Arab-
Muslim democrats. But this is another story,
for a future set of reflections, hopefully from
the freedom beyond this prison.
G r i e v a n c e s
The accounts to be settled, as perceived by
the Arab-Muslim world, abound. The list of
grievances would vary somewhat from one
Arab-Muslim country to another, and from
one specific constituency to another within
each country. The list would include diverse
and even contradictory items – such as re-
strictive migration measures against Turks
and North Africans into Western Europe,
American military presence in the Gulf, the
frequent US congressional threat of with-
drawing American units from the multina-
tional forces in Egyptian Sinai, one-sided sup-
port for Israel, MacDonald's, Coca-Cola, deca-
dent Hollywood movies, excessive Western
corporate presence, too little Western invest-
ment in the Arab-Muslim Middle East, and
enforced values like consumerism and family
planning. It all depends on who you talk to, in
which country, and at which point in time.
But there is a core of common grievances
that nearly all Arabs and Muslims deeply
hold against 'the West'. These include mili-
tary humiliation, colonial occupation, pillag-
ing of resources, political domination, cul-
tural subjugation, and territorial fragmenta-
tion of the Homeland. Half a century ago,
'the West' was concretely the Dutch to In-
donesians at one end of the 'arch of crises',
and the French to Algerians and Morocco at
the other end of the arch. In the middle, it
was the British to peoples and cultures –
Malaysians, Bengalis, Urdus, Afghanis, Per-
sians, Mashreq Arabs, and Egyptians. More
recently, the West has become condensed
and symbolized by America.
Ironically the US was never a colonial
power in the classical imperial sense – at
least not in the Arab-Muslim world. But
there are symbolic and instrumental rea-
sons for this collective perception, and it is
more than an implication by kinship with
the old colonial powers of Europe. This will
become more evident shortly.
At the very epicentre of Arab-Muslim core
grievances towards the West is Palestine. It
has been an open wound in the most sensi-
tive spot at nearly the exact midpoint. The
pains of that open wound may have been
felt less by those far away – say, the peoples
of Indonesia and Morocco at the two pe-
ripheral ends of the arch. But thanks to the
electronic media, scenes of brutalization of
Palestinians have become daily news on
television screens in the most isolated ham-
lets of Java and Agadir. How else could any
fair observer account for the post-Septem-
ber 11 demonstrations witnessed in some of
these countries – albeit to the embarrass-
ment of their own official leadership, which
dutifully paid homage to the victims of the
American tragedy. For sizeable segments,
though by no means all of the public opin-
ion in the arch, it was divine justice at work –
retribution for all the injustices perpetrated
by the West upon 'us' in Palestine, Iraq, and
elsewhere for so long. America is perceived
to be the permanent supporter of the Zion-
ist Israeli state, while keeping the Arab-Is-
lamic world 'divided, sapped, weak, domi-
nated, exploited and humiliated'. Some may
add that all of this is really about protecting
oil interests in the Gulf, and now in the
Caspian Sea.
Responses to the war
For most Arabs and Muslims, arguments
about defeating the terrorists responsible
for innocent victims of the WTC and the
Pentagon may have been sympathetically
listened to between September 11 and Oc-
tober 7, though with the caveat 'and what
about the innocent Palestinians and Iraqis?'
– in an obvious reference to the fact that
they have been killed or bombed by Ameri-
can weapons either directly or at the hands
of their 'Israeli clients'. After October 7, the
American bombing of targets in Afghan-
istan was labelled by the leading main-
stream Al-Ahram al-Arabi weekly (3 Novem-
ber 2001) as outright barbarism. In this view,
no excuse or pretext justifies American air
raids, which could never avoid victimizing
innocent Afghan civilians.
By November 7, one month after the start
of the bombing, one could hardly find an
Arab columnist of any note who would justi-
fy the American war against Afghanistan. It
was no longer a 'war against terrorism' as
sanctioned by the UN Security Council for
legitimate action in self-defence. In the heat
of battle all such legalisms are pushed to the
margins. By now, the approximately 3,000
innocent American civilians killed by a pre-
meditated act of terrorism seem to have
been forgotten or deeply pushed into the
Arab-Muslim collective subconscious. Now,
it is only the moving picture of Afghanis
–starving children in refugee camps on the
border with Pakistan – or the mutilated bod-
ies in the aftermath of American bombs,
some of which invariably fall on civilian tar-
gets. These media images compete with
similar ones from Palestine which have
been displayed throughout the 13 months
of the Al-Aqsa Intifada. A cartoon on the
front page of the most secular liberal A l -
Wafd daily (1 November 2001) summed it
up: American President Bush and Israeli
Prime Minister Sharon standing in two adja-
cent, but obviously competing, butcher
shops, each busily slaughtering children –
'Afghani flavour' and 'Palestinian flavour' re-
spectively – with a big sign advertising dis-
count prices for Muslim meat.
Combat statistics, in view of images and
cartoons like these, lose their relevance over
time. Thus to say that the US lost in one hour
three times more than the combined losses
of Palestinians in one year (700) and Afgha-
nis in one month (2,000) seems irrelevant to
an average citizen in Pakistan, Egypt, or Mo-
rocco. It is what social psychologists call the
'immediacy effect' – American victims were
killed two months earlier, but Afghanis and
Palestinians are 'being slaughtered right
now, now, as we speak, do something about
it!'. It is this immediacy effect, thanks again
to satellite communications displaying the
maimed and displaced, which accounts for
the anti-American demonstrations in Arab-
Muslim capitals.
But there are other effects which play in
favour of Taliban Afghanistan in fuelling
similar demonstrations in other countries
far beyond the Arab-Muslim World – e.g.
Korea, Japan and several Latin American
countries. Among these other effects is a
David vs. Goliath syndrome (Bin Laden vs.
Bush), or the Taliban as a 'Cinderella hero'.
There is no doubt of the presence of a quota
of envy among the poor and marginal vis-à-
vis US power, wealth, and hegemony in a
unipolar world system. Among a limited
sample of fellow prison inmates (both polit-
ical and criminal), I have detected satisfac-
tion, if not outright delight, in observing
American humiliation and widespread fear
because of the suicide bombings and subse-
quent Anthrax panic. This degree of spite,
coming at a moment of a colossal human
tragedy, could only be a function of deep
bitterness, un-redressed historical griev-
ances, and contemporary open wounds.
Usama Bin Laden is fast emerging as a folk
hero to millions of the angry and frustrated
in the Arab-Muslim world. To them, he has
eluded and frightened the sole superpower
and its other Western allies. He and his mod-
est Taliban allies with minimal weapons,
primitive technology, access to one regional
television channel (Al-Jazeera) and a tiny re-
source base have already stood up and re-
sisted the firepower of the strongest coun-
try in history for four weeks – i.e. longer than
Saddam Hussein with his one million-strong
army in the 1991 Gulf War; and five times
longer than Egypt, Syria, and Jordan stood
up to much less Israeli firepower in the 1967
Six Day War. By these standards, Arab-Mus-
lim youngsters may be justified in their ad-
miration of Bin Laden's defiance. He has
largely won the current battle over the
hearts, if not the minds, of the Arab-Muslim
w o r l d .
Legitimate accounts
But will Bin Laden and his Taliban brothers
win the war against the West?
From the humble view of an Arab prisoner
of conscience, the answer is a big 'NO'. Bin
Laden is one in a chain of Arab-Muslim lead-
ers who defied, challenged, and engaged
the West in grand battles. But in the end,
they have all lost their wars against the
West. This all started with Egypt's Nasser
half a century ago, and continued with
Libya's Qaddafi, Syria's Assad, Iraq's Sad-
dam, and now Saudi-Afghani Bin Laden. The
initial battle cry of each one of these chal-
lengers resonated deeply and widely with
the Arab-Muslim masses. Some cried out
under the banner of Arab Nationalism, oth-
ers under the banner of Islam. All of them in-
voked the cause of Palestine and specifically
the liberation of Jerusalem. These two caus-
es have tremendous emotive power. How-
ever, each of the above challengers tagged
Palestine and Jerusalem on to his own per-
sonal ambitions for power and his ideologi-
cal hopes for remaking the world.
Initial successes in overpowering local foes
or bleeding external enemies, using zealous
true believers, whipping up the cheers of
spectators – all are tempting, and always de-
ceiving. Sheer grand vision and scores of
zealots have never alone been sufficient, in
our region or elsewhere in the world, in sus-
taining a credible challenge, much less in
achieving ultimate victory. History is a vast
graveyard of the likes of Bin Laden and his
pan-Islamic A l - Q aci d a network, the Taliban
movement and millions of distant admiring
but powerless masses. All we need to antici-
pate the unfolding of events in this particu-
lar drama is to look back to Egypt's Nasser in
the 1960s. As then, Bin Laden made a thun-
derous entrance onto the world stage. He
may very well end the same – i.e. withering
away after a resounding defeat, or getting
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killed in battle and going down as a martyr
Che Guevera style.
Yes, Bin Laden may have touched on most
if not all the Arab-Muslim world's historical
grievances. He may have demanded force-
fully to settle legitimate accounts. In these
respects he is echoing the deep yearning of
at least eight generations of Arabs and Mus-
lims – as his fellow desert reformer-warrior
Mohamed bin Abul-Wahab had tried at the
end of the 18t h century. But Bin Laden's me-
dieval language of discourse, his Wahabi
austere fundamentalist version of Islam, the
oppressive model of society imposed in
Afghanistan, and the terrorist methods used
to settle legitimate accounts with the out-
side world, all put him outside the main-
stream of history. They make him the wrong
accountant. His only remaining value, if any,
may be that of shocking mankind into con-
sciousness that there is urgent regional-
global business that must be equitably and
forcefully addressed, before another Bin
Laden – possibly more lethal – forces his
way to the world's centre stage again, and
takes us all to the brink of apocalypse.
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